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THE CHALLENGE OF DOMESTIC
IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN THE
COTTON FIELD CASE
Caroline Bettinger-Lopez†
It is only fitting that a symposium commemorating Professor
Rhonda Copelon’s contributions to today’s human and women’s
rights movements would end with a panel on implementation. Due
to the efforts and notable successes of advocates—including, quite
prominently, Copelon—we have witnessed great normative devel-
opment in the field of international women’s human rights in re-
cent decades. Several international bodies—among them, the
Committee on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights—have
found that gender-based violence, including domestic violence,
can constitute impermissible discrimination under international
law.1 International treaties and jurisprudence have begun to recog-
nize that such discrimination can take on “multiple” or “intersec-
tional” forms when it affects marginalized populations, such as
indigenous, poor, or minority women and girls.2  Sexual orienta-
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mentor. Sincere thanks to Ana Romes, and additionally to Gracia Cuzzi and Giuliana
Soldi, for superb research assistance that contributed to this essay. Special thanks to
Professor Julia E. Monárrez Fragoso from El Colegio de la Frontera Norte in Ciudad
Juarez, Mexico, for her valuable insight into the situation in Juárez, Mexico.
1 Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women [CEDAW], Gen-
eral Recommendation No. 19, Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/
Rev. 1 ¶ 6 (1994); Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, ¶¶ 74–75 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2009); Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 80/11, ¶¶ 110, 165, 199 (2011) [hereinafter Gonzales]; González v.
Mexico (Cotton Field), Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205., ¶ 395 (Nov. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Cotton
Field]; Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, ¶ 303 (Nov. 25, 2006).
2 Inter-Am. Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Vio-
lence Against Women, June 9, 1994, 27 U.S.T. 3301, 1438 U.N.T.S. 63 [hereinafter
Convention of Belém do Pará]; Gonzales, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Re-
port No. 80/11, ¶ 6; Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C.) No. 205, ¶ 113 (2011);
Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215 (Aug. 30, 2010); Rosendo Cantú v.
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tion and gender identity have been found to be protected classes
under international law,3 and sexual violence has been found to be
a form of torture when perpetrated by state agents.4 International
human rights bodies have also examined the question of how states
might best respond to structural discrimination and stereotypes,
and have incorporated their conclusions into comprehensive repa-
rations orders.5 These bodies have begun to comprehensively ex-
amine the concept of state duty to act with the “due diligence”
necessary to prevent, protect, investigate, sanction, and offer repa-
rations in cases of violence against women and discrimination per-
petrated by state and non-state actors, particularly in a context
where these problems are pervasive and impunity is the norm.6
The development of these standards marks great progress for
the international women’s human rights movement. While norma-
tive development remains an ever-present and evolving goal, the
greatest challenge today’s movement faces is that of implementa-
tion—that is, “the process of putting international commitments
into practice.”7 The efficacy, authority, and credibility of an inter-
national court or human rights body, it has been noted, are mea-
sured principally by the implementation of its judgments and other
Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216 (Aug. 31, 2010); Ana, Beatriz, and Cecilia González Pérez
(Mexico), Case 11.565, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 53/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/
II.111, doc. 20 (2001).
3 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 91 (Feb. 24, 2012); Salgeuiro da Silva Mouta v.
Portugal, App. No. 33290/96, ¶ 36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999); Christine Goodwin v. The
United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95 (Eur. Ct. H R. 2002).
4 Raquel Martı́n de Mejı́a v. Peru, Case 10.970, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Report No. 5/
96, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.91, doc. 7 rev. (1996); Cantú, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
216, ¶ 118
5 See, e.g., Opuz, App. No. 33401/02; Fatma Yildrim v. Austria, Communication
No. 6/2005, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005, ¶ 12.1.1 (2007); A.T. v. Hungary,
Commc’n No. 2/2003, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/A/60/38/2005, ¶ 9.2 (2005); Convention
of Belém do Pará, supra note 2, arts. 6 & 7(g). See also Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 5(a), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 [hereinafter CEDAW Convention]; Rosa M. Celorio, The
Rights of Women in the Inter-American System of Human Rights: Current Opportunities and
Challenges in Standard-Setting, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 854 (2011); Gonzales, 12.626,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11 ¶ 6.
6 See Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 113. See also Maia Fernan-
des v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 54/01, OEA/Ser.L./
V/II.111, doc. 20 (2001). The concept of “due diligence” was originally developed in
the case of Velásquez Rodrı́guez. Only recently has the concept been applied to gender.
7 Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations
and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 538, 539 (Walter Carl-
snaes et al., eds., 2002).
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opinions resembling jurisprudence.8
The challenge of domestic implementation of international
human rights law carries many dimensions. International human
rights bodies “are notable in our international order precisely be-
cause they have the authority to regulate national sovereigns, but at
the same time, they generally lack recourse to an international sov-
ereign power to enforce those orders.”9 In light of this, the follow-
ing questions become paramount when considering domestic
implementation: What level of deference is given to international
human rights law by a state’s domestic legal and political regime?
What are the implications of a state’s internal political organization
(e.g., democratic, federalist, etc.) for implementation in both the-
ory and practice? How do law, policy, and politics interact on the
ground to influence implementation of norms promulgated by an
international body or a decision from an international tribunal?
What role do social movements play in the realization of interna-
tional human rights law at the domestic level?
Beyond these structural questions are mechanical questions
surrounding how states can most effectively realize the “due dili-
gence” elements noted above—namely, the duties to prevent, in-
vestigate, and provide redress for rights violations, protect victims,
and sanction perpetrators. Each of these elements must be consid-
ered at both the individual level—with respect to the individual(s)
whose rights were violated—and at the policy level—with respect to
state policies and practices. The full implementation of the norma-
tive developments described at the beginning of this essay may re-
quire a wholesale restructuring of the state apparatus on multiple
fronts.
With few best practice models upon which we may rely, the
implementation challenge in the human rights field can feel insur-
mountable. Indeed, as Harold Koh has noted, “human rights is the
subject matter area in international affairs where the largest en-
forcement deficit exists, inasmuch as the costs of enforcement ap-
pear high and the benefits seem low by traditional state interest
8 See OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, FROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONS (2010), available at http://
www.soros.org/sites/default/files/from-judgment-to-justice-20101122.pdf; Steering
Comm. for Human Rights (CDDH) Reflection Group on the Reinforcement of the
Human Rights Protection Mechanism (CDDH–GDR) Draft Addendum to the Final
Report Containing CDDH Proposals, CDDH–GDR (2003) (Mar. 12, 2003).
9 OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 12.
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calculations.”10 The Open Society Justice Initiative has described
this deficit as an “implementation crisis [that] currently afflicts the
regional and international legal bodies charged with protecting
human rights.”11
Rhonda Copelon, the brilliant scholar, formulated and ex-
panded upon many of these questions concerning implementation
in her writing and teaching. And then, in the same breath, Rhonda
Copelon, the brilliant advocate-lawyer, helped forge a roadmap,
through her briefs, reports, and other advocacy documents, for
how advocates might pursue real change on the ground that is
guided by human rights principles.
In this essay, I explore normative developments in the
landmark Cotton Field case before the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights—developments envisioned and championed by
Rhonda Copelon, among others—and describe Copelon’s vision
for how those norms might be put into place in Mexico. I then
briefly summarize the state of implementation of the court’s deci-
sion and offer closing thoughts on the road ahead. As I discuss, the
challenges of domestic implementation remain abundant, though
important steps have been taken in a positive direction.
THE COTTON FIELD JUDGMENT: NORMATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
On November 16, 2009, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights issued a landmark decision in González and Others v. México,
known familiarly as the Cotton Field (Campo Algodonero, in Spanish)
case.12 The court ruled that Mexico violated both the American
Convention of Human Rights (“American Convention”) and the
Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and
Eradication of Violence Against Women (“Convention of Belém do
Pará”) when it failed to prevent and investigate the gendered dis-
appearances and murders of three poor migrant women, two of
whom were minors.13 These incidents, the court emphasized, took
place in the context of a fifteen-year series of hundreds of unsolved
and poorly investigated disappearances, rapes, and murders of
poor, young, predominantly-migrant women and girls in Ciudad
10 Harold H. Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975, 979
(2005).
11 OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 8, at 11.
12 Cotton Field, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).
13 Id.
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Juárez, a Mexican city across the border from El Paso, Texas, with a
population of 1.5 million.
The Cotton Field decision is important for a number of reasons.
In terms of the legal foundations upon which the court relied, it is
significant that the court found violations of both the American
Convention, the foundational treaty of the Inter-American system14
which has had a particularly important role in the development of
the court’s “due diligence” jurisprudence in the area of, inter alia,
forced disappearances,15 and the Convention of Belém do Pará, a
newer treaty (adopted in 1994) that is the most ratified instrument
in the Inter-American system and the only multi-lateral treaty that
focuses exclusively on the issue of violence against women.16 Also,
as described in more detail below, the court analyzed the relation-
ship between the rights and obligations contained in these two
treaties.17
Moreover, the court’s legal conclusions in Cotton Field are un-
precedented. For the first time, the court found that states have
affirmative obligations to respond to violence against women by
private actors, and that those obligations are justiciable under arti-
cle 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará. Additionally, the court
examined the cases at issue in the context of mass violence against
women and structural discrimination, found that gender-based vio-
lence constitutes gender discrimination, and articulated its most
comprehensive definition to date of gender-sensitive reparations.18
In its judgment, the court found Mexico responsible for numerous
rights violations:
• The rights to life, personal integrity, and personal liberty of
the victims recognized in articles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2), and 7(1)
of the American Convention and the obligation to investi-
gate—and thereby guarantee—such rights and adopt do-
14 I use the term “Inter-American system” to refer to the Inter-American Human
Rights System, the regional human rights system of the Organization of American
States (“OAS”) that is composed of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
15 See, e.g., Velásquez-Rodrı́guez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988).
16 Thirty-two member states of the OAS have ratified the Convention of Belém do
Pará. See Organization of Am. States, Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women, Preamble. & arts. 1–9,
June 9, 1994, 27 U.S.T. 3301, 1438 U.N.T.S. 63.
17 Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 205, ¶¶ 287–389.
18 Id; see also Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Inter-American Court Rules Against Mexico on
Gender Violence in Cuidad Juárez (Jan. 18, 2010 4:04 AM), http://ssrn.com/abstract=155
0873.
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mestic legal measures established in articles 1(1) and 2, in
addition to the obligations established in articles 7(b) (due
diligence to prevent, investigate, and impose penalties for
violence against women) and 7(c) (penal, civil, administra-
tive provisions to prevent, punish, and eradicate violence
against women) of the Convention of Belém do Pará.19
• The rights of access to justice and to judicial protection, em-
bodied in articles 8(1) and 25(1), in connection to articles
1(1) and 2 of the American Convention, and 7(b) and 7(c)
of the Convention of Belém do Pará, to the detriment of the
victims’ next of kin.20
• The obligation not to discriminate, contained in article 1(1)
of the American Convention, in connection to the obliga-
tion to investigate and guarantee the rights contained in ar-
ticles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2), and 7(1), to the detriment of the
three victims; and also in relation to access to justice embod-
ied in articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the Convention, to the det-
riment of the victims’ next of kin.21
• The rights of the child, embodied in article 19, in relation to
articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention, to the detri-
ment of the two minor victims.22
• The right to personal integrity in articles 5(1) and 5(2), in
connection to article 1(1) of the American Convention, due
to the suffering caused to and harassment of the victims’
next of kin.23
In considering the violations, the court reiterated the ele-
ments of due diligence—the state duties to prevent, investigate,
punish, and compensate human rights violations, including those
committed by private actors—originally articulated in the seminal
case Velásquez Rodrı́guez v. Honduras.24 Further, the court consid-
ered the element of discrimination that overlaid the substantive
law violations and noted the hostile stereotypes of state authorities
toward the victims and their families. “The creation and use of ste-
reotypes,” the court found, “becomes one of the causes and conse-
quences of gender-based violence against women.”25 Ultimately,
19 Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 602(4-5).
20 Id. ¶ 602(5).
21 Id. ¶ 602(5).
22 Id. ¶ 602(7).
23 Id. ¶ 602(8-9).
24 Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 172,
166–67, 182 (July 29, 1988).
25 Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 401; see also Brief for the Int’l
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the court found, “the violence against women [in this case] consti-
tuted a form of discrimination.”26
The court also ruled on an important jurisdictional question
in Cotton Field; namely, the question of the justiciability of articles 7,
8, and 9 of the Convention of Belém do Pará—a treaty which, it
bears mention, Rhonda Copelon played a role in drafting. The
court concluded that, as per article 12 of that treaty, it had jurisdic-
tion over claims brought under article 7, which provides that states
must condemn all forms of violence against women and agree to
pursue, by all appropriate measures and without delay, policies to
prevent, punish, and eradicate such violence through legal, legisla-
tive, administrative, and policy initiatives. The court further con-
cluded that it did not have jurisdiction over claims brought directly
under article 8—by which states “agree to undertake progressively
specific measures” to eradicate violence against women—or under
article 9—by which states “shall take special account” of vulnerable
groups of women. Still, the court found that the various articles of
the Convention—including articles 8 and 9—can nevertheless be
useful to aid interpretation of article 7 of the Convention of Belém
do Pará and of other pertinent Inter-American instruments, such
as the American Convention.27
This last pronouncement was especially important to Rhonda
Copelon. Copelon served as an expert witness before the court in
the Cotton Field case in April 2009, arguing that “articles 7–9 of Be-
lém do Pará provide a thorough and gender sensitive outline of
both immediate and progressive initiatives for the effective imple-
mentation of reparations.”28 The programs outlined in article 8,
Copelon argued, give definition and specificity to the legal, legisla-
tive, policy, and administrative measures for eradicating violence
against women that are laid out in article 7(c), (e), and (h).29
Moreover, Copelon’s testimony underscored that the measures ar-
ticulated in articles 7 and 8 should arguably be tailored to take
“special account” of vulnerable groups of women, as per article 9.30
Reprod. and Sexual Health Law Programme, Univ. of Toronto Faculty of Law et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Cotton Field, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 205 (2009).
26 Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 402.
27 Id. ¶ 79.
28 Rhonda Copelon, Professor of Int’l Law and Director, Int’l Women’s Human
Rights Law Clinic, City Univ. of N.Y. School of Law, Expert Testimony Before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Case of Cotton Field, ¶ 33, (Apr. 28,
2009) [hereinafter Copelon Expert Testimony].
29 Id. ¶ 37.
30 Id. ¶ 12.
322 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:315
Copelon’s arguments were echoed in an amicus brief submitted to
the court by more than fifty U.S.-based individuals and organiza-
tions, which argued that Mexico’s longstanding failure to investi-
gate, prosecute, or prevent the gender-based crimes in this case
violated its obligations under international human rights law.31
I would be remiss not to mention Judge Cecilia Medina’s con-
curring opinion in Cotton Field, in which she contends that the
court should have found a violation of the prohibition on torture
contained in article 5(2) of the American Convention. Judge Me-
dina champions the adoption of the three-part test set forth by the
International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia “to determine ele-
ments in torture that are uncontentious and that constitute, conse-
quently, jus cogens: (i) infliction, by act or omission, of severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental; (ii) the intentional nature
of the act, and (iii) the motive or purpose of the act to reach a
certain goal.”32 Medina asserts that the suffering at issue in the case
was sufficiently severe to constitute torture, as other international
bodies have repeatedly found in cases involving gender-based
violence.
Here, too, Rhonda Copelon’s fingerprints can be found on
Judge Medina’s concurrence. Copelon, in her pathbreaking article
Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture,
first set forth the theory that domestic violence, when the state fails
to intervene, can constitute a form of torture that implicates state
responsibility under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT Con-
vention”).33 For years, she championed the idea that gender-based
violence and abuse—whether committed by state actors or private
actors when officially countenanced—could amount to torture, or,
where less severe or lacking in impermissible purpose, was cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.34 The CAT
Committee’s 2007 General Comment No. 2, which addresses the
erosion of human rights during the post-September 11th era,35
31 Brief for Amnesty Int’l et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Cotton Field,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 205 (2009).
32 Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 205 (Medina Quiroga, J., concur-
ring)(citing Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Judgment, ¶ 483 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001)).
33 Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Tor-
ture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 356–58 (1994).
34 See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, Gender Violence as Torture: The Contribution of CAT Gen-
eral Comment No. 2, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 229 (2008).
35 Comm. Against Torture [CAT], General Comment No. 2, Implementation of
Article 2 by States Parties, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Jan. 24, 2008).
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mainstreams gender and embraces Copelon’s vision. Specifically,
the General Comment underscores State parties’ obligation to
“prevent and protect victims from gender-based violence, such as
rape, domestic violence, female genital mutilation and trafficking”
and emphasizes that gender, amongst other identifying characteris-
tics, is a “key factor” in determining an individual’s risk of torture
or ill treatment.36
REPARATIONS: PROGRESS AND LIMITATIONS
After comprehensively articulating the prevention, investiga-
tion, and punishment aspects of Mexico’s due diligence obliga-
tions from a gender perspective, Copelon’s expert testimony
honed in on the hardest question: that of reparations. Interna-
tional law recognizes the right of victims to reparations bearing the
following components: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.37
Using articles 7, 8, and 9 of the Convention of Belém do Pará
as a guidepost, Copelon proposed a framework for the implemen-
tation of reparations. First, she reiterated a principle near and dear
to her heart: “women victims and their advocates must be enabled
to participate fully in the design and implementation of all mea-
sures of reparations.”38 Copelon was a fierce advocate for the prin-
36 Id. ¶¶ 18, 22–23. As Copelon later wrote, “General Comment No. 2 provides
important guidance as to the application of the Convention to gender violence [. . .]
clarifies the State’s responsibility for gendered torture inflicted by non-officials and
private actors and thus closes a potentially huge and discriminatory gap in the moni-
toring and implementation of the CAT Convention.” Copelon, supra note 34, at
256–57 (2008).
37 Copelon Expert Testimony, supra note 28, ¶ 32. See also Thomas M. Antkowiak,
Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L., Vol. 2, 362 (2008). Antkowiak defines “com-
pensation” as monetary reparations and defines the equitable components of repara-
tions as follows:
Restitution comprehends restoring the victim to his or her original situ-
ation, such as a restoration of liberty, while rehabilitation includes
‘medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services.’ Sat-
isfaction is comprised of a variety of possible measures: from apologies,
‘full and public disclosure of the truth,’ and victim memorials, to judi-
cial and administrative sanctions against the responsible parties. ‘Guar-
antees of non-repetition’ are equally diverse, including, inter alia, the
establishment of effective civilian control over state security forces and
human rights educational and training programs.
Id. (citing to Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Repara-
tion for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc A/RES/
60/147, at 1 (Mar. 21, 2006)).
38 Copelon Expert Testimony, supra note 28, ¶ 34.
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ciple that we, as lawyers, must listen to our clients; that our clients
know what’s best for themselves and for other affected individuals;
and that clients can challenge us lawyers to think outside the box.
Second, citing Aloeboetoe v. Suriname,39 Copelon emphasized that
“remedies must be fashioned to enable beneficiaries to overcome
the discriminatory conditions of the past.”40 Structural discrimina-
tion in Mexican legal and criminal justice institutions, and society
generally, could not be decoupled from the specific events at issue
in the case. Third, she contended, “rehabilitative relief is not lim-
ited to providing psychological counseling . . . Socio-economic re-
lief [is critical] . . . where the victims are young or socio-
economically marginalized.”41 Finally, with respect to the obliga-
tion of satisfaction and non-repetition, Copelon emphasized the
importance of the right to truth, the incorporation of gender prin-
ciples into ongoing legal and institutional change, state investiga-
tion of responsible officials, and measures to address the state-
created environment of impunity and the underlying gender-based
violence and discrimination.42 This last point, Copelon under-
scored, is where article 8 of the Convention of Belém do Pará be-
comes especially useful.43
Copelon’s influence was evident in the court’s reparations
award in Cotton Field.  As Ruth Rubio-Marin and Clara Sandoval
have observed, the court’s reparations analysis was guided by a ho-
listic gender approach and a “transformative agenda.”44 “[B]earing
in mind the context of structural discrimination in which the facts
of this case occurred,” the court said, “the reparations must be de-
signed to change this situation, so that their effect is not only of
restitution, but also of rectification. In this regard, re-establishment
of the same structural context of violence and discrimination is not
acceptable.”45 The court underscored, as key elements to its trans-
formative agenda, that reparations should take into account a gen-
der perspective and should be “designed to identify and eliminate
39 See Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 11 (Sept. 10, 1993).
40 Copelon Expert Testimony, supra note 28, ¶ 35.
41 Id. ¶ 36.
42 Id. ¶ 37.
43 Id.
44 Ruth Rubio-Marin & Clara Sandoval, Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Promise of the Cotton Field Judgment, 33
HUM. RTS Q. 1062, 1083 (2011).
45 Cotton Field, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205., ¶ 450 (Nov. 16, 2009).
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the factors that cause discrimination.”46
The reparations ordered by the Inter-American Court in Cot-
ton Field were remarkable. The court ordered Mexico to comply
with a broad set of remedial measures, including pecuniary and
non-pecuniary reparations of more than $200,000 to each family in
the suit, publication of the judgment, the State’s public acknowl-
edgment of international responsibility, construction of a national
memorial, and state-financed medical, psychological, and psychiat-
ric care to the victims’ families.47 Remedies aimed at guaranteeing
non-repetition included: renewed investigations, prosecutions, and
punishment for perpetrators;48 investigations of public servants
who failed to exercise due diligence in responding to the disap-
pearances and murders and, in some cases, threatened or perse-
cuted the victim’s next of kin, and a public announcement of the
results of such investigations;49 the standardization of investigative
protocols concerning cases of sexual violence and parameters to be
taken into account when implementing rapid investigation re-
sponses in the case of disappearances of women and girls;50 crea-
tion and updating of a national website and database with
information on all missing women and girls;51 training of all per-
sonnel in Mexico involved, directly or indirectly, in the prevention,
investigation, and prosecution of violence against women; and the
development of an educational program for the people of the
State of Chihuahua, to ameliorate the situation of gender-based vi-
olence there.52
The court, however, rejected the argument advanced by the
Inter-American Commission and Petitioners that, as a matter of
non-repetition, Mexico should be required to design, coordinate,
and implement a long-term national policy to guarantee due dili-
gence in responding to cases of violence against women.53 The
court found that it had not been provided with “sufficient argu-
ments” on “why the series of measures already adopted by the State
cannot be considered an ‘integral, coordinated policy.’”54
Rubio-Marin and Sandoval praise the court’s willingness to
46 Id. ¶ 451.
47 Id. ¶¶ 468–71, 549–86.
48 Id. ¶¶ 452, 455.
49 Id. ¶¶ 456–62, 465-66.
50 Id. ¶¶ 497–502, 506.
51 Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 512.
52 Id. ¶¶ 541–43; see also Rubio-Marin & Sandoval, supra note 44, at 1088–89.
53 Cotton Field, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 205, ¶¶ 475, 493.
54 Id. ¶ 493.
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embrace a gender-sensitive approach when interpreting Mexico’s
due diligence obligations and adopting “transformative repara-
tions.” However, they argue, the court, in rejecting the request by
the Commission and Petitioners that the court require a coordi-
nated, long-term national policy, “lost a major opportunity to apply
its own concept of transformative reparations to the awards it
made.”55 The onus, they argue, should have been on Mexico—not
on the Commission or the victims—to provide evidence both as to
the existence of such a policy and, critically, why any policies cur-
rently in place can be expected to prevent future violations. “Even
more,” Rubio-Marin and Sandoval argue, “the Court could have
taken a more constructive approach to the problem and called for
the establishment of an expert team to assess the effectiveness of
[the] measures [Mexico had already adopted], identify their short-
comings, and put forward recommendations.”56
My strong suspicion is that Rhonda Copelon would have
agreed wholeheartedly with Rubio-Marin and Sandoval. Structural
change, Copelon thought, could only be achieved through whole-
sale reform at every level in society—legal and non-legal, institu-
tional and popular. I can see Copelon nodding her head and
gently but firmly suggesting that without a coordinated, long-term
national plan endorsed by the State to combat the massive epi-
demic of gender-based violence, murders, and disappearances in
Ciudad Juárez, the problem will not—and cannot—be adequately
addressed or resolved.
DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COTTON FIELD JUDGMENT:
AN ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS TO DATE
Such a dismal forecast, unfortunately, appears to be the reality
currently before us. On June 23, 2012, the New York Times pub-
lished a story, Wave of Violence Swallows More Women in Juárez, which
painted a grim picture of the current situation in Ciudad Juárez.
Despite international pressure and Mexican authorities’ promises
to prioritize gender-based violence cases, the Times reports,
[r]oughly 60 women and girls have been killed [in Ciudad Juá-
rez] so far this year; at least 100 have been reported missing over
the past two years. And though the death toll for women so far
this year is on track to fall below the high of 304 in 2010, state
officials say there have already been more women killed in 2012
than in any year of the earlier so-called femicide era. This time,
55 Rubio-Marin & Sandoval, supra note 44, at 1090.
56 Id. at 1089.
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though, the response has been underwhelming.”57
The article goes on to describe poor, inconsistent, and obstruction-
ist responses by authorities to disappearances and murders of wo-
men and girls, and the recent discoveries of “new clusters of slain
women,” some in mass graves.58
So what is the current status of the court-ordered remedies?
With respect to the court’s mandate that Mexican authorities put
renewed efforts into investigations, the Federal Attorney General
has organized a special working group to improve Mexico’s capac-
ity to investigate the crimes.59 Together with the U.S. Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (“FBI”), the Mexican government has
purportedly established a public national database to aid in match-
ing known DNA samples with biological samples taken from crime
scenes, though the database’s functionality is dubious.60 The Mexi-
can government states that it continues to investigate the murders
of the three named victims, with a “broader perspective” but with
the same “team of professionals.”61 Mexico claims that this investi-
gation now has access to a program called Attention to Victims that
incorporates a gender perspective into the investigation.62
Investigations also continue regarding the allegations of irreg-
ularities.63 The Mexican government claims to have enacted thirty-
six different administrative sanctions against officials.64 With re-
spect to allegations of harassment against the victims’ families, the




59 GOV’T OF MEX., PRIMER INFORME DEL ESTADO MEXICANO SOBRE LAS MEDIDAS
ADOPTADAS PARA EL CUMPLIMIENTO A LA SENTENCIA DICTADA POR LA CORTE INTERAMERI-
CANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN EL CASO “GONZÁLEZ BANDA Y OTRAS VS. MÉXICO
(CAMPO ALGODONERO)” [First Report of the Mexican Government regarding the mea-
sures adopted to fulfill the orders of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from
the Case González v. Mexico (Campo Algodonero)] 5 (2010), available at http://www.
campoalgodonero.org.mx/documentos/primer-informe-del-estado-mexicano-medi
das-adoptadas-cumplimiento-sentencia-dictada-corte [hereinafter PRIMER INFORME].
This report is available through a website maintained by the Roundtable of Women of
Ciudad Juarez (Red Mesa de Mujeres) and by the Latin American and Caribbean
Committee for the Defense of Women’s Rights (Comité de América Latina y el Caribe
para la Defensa de los Derechos de las Mujeres). See CAMPO ALGODONERO, http://
www.campoalgodonero.org.mx (last visited Nov. 21, 2012). The report itself gives no
indication of having been published or released by the Mexican Government, other
than the title.
60 PRIMER INFORME, supra note 59, at 5.
61 Id. at 20.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 30.
64 Id. at 31.
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Mexican government claims that no reports of any such actions ex-
ist in any federal or local entity.65 A representative of the victims’
families claims that the government has not even opened cases
against at least thirty-one functionaries that were known to have
intervened in investigations.66
With respect to the court’s order that Mexico raise public
awareness of the three murders and the general situation of gen-
der-based violence in Ciudad Juárez, the government reports that,
having published the text (in full and in part, depending on the
forum) of the court’s decision in national and local newspapers,
governmental websites, and official federal and local gazettes, it has
achieved more than the court required with respect to the publica-
tion and communication of the court’s ruling.67 Notably, the Gen-
der Equality Program of Mexico’s Supreme Court of Justice of the
Nation website provides extensive information regarding the disap-
pearance and deaths of women in Ciudad Juárez. This information
includes a full version of the court’s decision, several amicus briefs,
the original complaint, and further analysis.68
According to the Mexican government, the victims’ families
rejected its plan to promulgate a public act to recognize its interna-
tional responsibility on December 10, 2010.69  Both the govern-
ment and the victims’ families agreed to conduct the public
ceremony and public apology on March 8, 2011.70 Subsequent ob-
stacles and difficulties caused this plan to change.
The design, construction, and inauguration of the monument
in memory of the victims in Ciudad Juárez have presented a series
of complications for government officials. Finding an appropriate
location for the monument was one of the first issues.71 On Decem-
ber 10, 2010, the Ministry of the Interior donated land for the
monument to the municipal government of Chihuahua.72 The site
of the monument was inaugurated on November 7, 2011.73
65 Id.
66 Gloria Leticia Dı́az, Niega SEGOB polı́tia de elusión contra sentencias de la CoIDH,
PROCESO (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=282116.
67 PRIMER INFORME, supra note 59, at 5.
68 Programa de Equidad de Género, Información relevante “Caso González y otras (’Campo
Algodonero’) vs. México” Sentencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, SUPREMA
CORTE DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACIÓN,  http://www.equidad.scjn.gob.mx/campo_al-
godonero.php (last visited Nov. 21, 2012).
69 PRIMER INFORME, supra note 59, at 14.
70 Id. at 14.
71 Id. at 5–6; see also id. at 16–18 for other technical difficulties regarding the loca-
tion of the proposed monument.
72 Id. at 6.
73 Estado pide perdón por feminicidios, EL UNIVERSAL Nov. 8, 2011.  http://www.el
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At the inauguration, the Deputy Secretary of Judicial Matters
and Human Rights of the Ministry of the Interior, Felipe Zamora
Castro, delivered the official apology.74 Mr. Zamora Castro “pro-
foundly lament[ed] the losses suffered by the families and by soci-
ety” due in part “to the lack of investigation into the events.”75 He
spoke for fifteen minutes and made specific reference to the
court’s ruling:
The Mexican state is conscious of the suffering it causes the vic-
tims’ families by not identifying, to date, those responsible for
the deaths of these young women. . .I want to apologize in the
name of the Mexican state. . .During these ten years and even
before, the entire [Mexican] State has committed various viola-
tions of human rights, and it is for this reason that today, in
fulfillment of the sentence dictated by the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights in the case of Campo Algodonero v. Mexico, the
Mexican State recognizes its responsibility.76
Mr. Zamora Castro delivered this speech at the site of the new
memorial, which was built on the same land where the women
were found ten years earlier.77
No one from the families of the three named victims attended
the inauguration.78 Families of other victims and parents of the dis-
appeared protested the inauguration of the memorial.79 Their
shouts of “Justice!” are muted on the official video of the inaugura-
tion, but are heard clearly on other non-official recordings.80 Fam-
ily members of missing or deceased girls demanded the
government investigate the disappearances and murders, not build
universal.com.mx/nacion/190591.html. The actual monument has not yet been
built.
74 Segobmexico, Palabras del Subsecretario Felipe Zamora, Inauguración del Memorial




77 Estado pide perdón por feminicidios, supra note 73.
78 Id.
79 Id.; see also Carlos Lara, Pide Gobernación perdón por feminicidios en Ciudad Juárez,
LA PRENSA, Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.oem.com.mx/laprensa/notas/n2300281.htm.
These protests, taken together with the absence of the named victims’ families, hint at
a profound disconnect between the court’s ruling and what victims’ families actually
need or want from local or federal government.
80 Segobmexico, Palabras del Subsecretario Felipe Zamora, Inauguración del Memorial
Campo Algodonero, YOUTUBE (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GYZ7g
FVz_LM; Vı́ctimas abuchean a autoridades en inauguración de monumento contra feminicidios
en Juárez (Grillonautas television broadcast Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.metatube.com/
en/videos/84275/Victimas-abuchean-a-autoridades-durante-inauguracion-contra-
feminicidios-en-Cd-Juarez/.
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memorials.81 One activist, Victoria Caraveo, criticized the amount
of money the Mexican government spent on building the memo-
rial and celebrating the inauguration: “It’s absurd what [these offi-
cials] are doing. They justify this by saying the Inter-American
Court ordered them to do this. But the Court didn’t say [the gov-
ernment] should spend 16 million [Mexican] pesos in the name of
three young girls.”82 Caraveo also criticized the federal government
for taking a leading role in delivering the official apology.83 Ac-
cording to Caraveo, the murders and disappearances are of local
character and do not require the presence of federal officials.84
With respect to the court’s order that Mexico build individual
and institutional capacity to conduct criminal investigations and
gender trainings, limited but notable progress has been made. The
Chihuahua Prosecutor’s Office maintains an easily accessible list of
disappeared women and girls on its website.85 This list is divided by
geographic area and also contains names of women and girls who
have been located since the initial report of a missing person.86
In response to previous recommendations made by the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW Committee”) with regard to the disappearance and
deaths of women in Ciudad Juárez, the federal government of Mex-
ico implemented an Action Program to Prevent and Eradicate Vio-
lence Against Women in Cuidad Juaréz, Chihuahua.87 This
program began in June 2004 and is known as the “40-point Pro-
gram of Action.”88 The “prosecution and enforcement of justice
and promotion of respect for women’s human rights” formed one
81 Lara, supra note 79; Estado pide perdón por feminicidios, EL UNIVERSAL, Nov. 8,
2011, http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/190591.html. See also Grillonautas,
supra note 80. Perhaps this calls into question whether these court-ordered remedies
conform to or reflect the actual demands of the victims’ families and whether these
remedies are even victim-centered or appropriate solutions.
82 Grillonautas, supra note 80.
83 Angélica Bustamante, Memorial, es un circo, es una enorme farza, EL MEXICANO,
Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.oem.com.mx/elmexicano/notas/n2300786.htm.
84 Id.
85 Reporte de Ausencia de Mujeres, FISCALÍA GENERAL DEL ESTADO DE CHIHUAHUA,
http://fiscalia.chihuahua.gob.mx/reporteextraviomujeres.htm; see also PRIMER IN-
FORME, supra note 59, at 10. The Chihuahua Prosecutor’s Office is a new government
agency established as part of a plan to provide better coordination of services. PRIMER
INFORME, supra note 59, at 36–37.
86 Reporte de Ausencia de Mujeres, supra note 85.
87 Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], Con-
sideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 18 of the Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 213, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/MEX/7-8 (2011).
88 Id.
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of the essential strategies of the 40-point Program of Action.89 The
government created, therefore, a Specialized Office for Female
Homicide Investigation in the State Prosecutor’s Office and a
Crime and Forensic Sciences Laboratory in Ciudad Juaréz.90 The
CEDAW Committee recognized that the Court’s ruling in Cotton
Field strengthened and reinforced the 40-point Program of
Action.91
In March 2012, the government inaugurated the “Women of
Ciudad Juárez Center for Justice,”92 a community center intended
to provide medical, psychological, and legal assistance.93 The Gov-
ernor of Chihuahua announced this as a governmental achieve-
ment in compliance with the court’s decision when he visited the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.94 However, the
Committee of Mothers of the Victims alleged that the Center was
opened with no guidelines, legal structures, or operating and pro-
cedural protocols, and with the sole purpose of falsely demonstrat-
ing compliance with the court’s ruling.95
The Mexican government claims that full monetary repara-
tions have been paid to the victims’ families.96 The government in-
sists it has attempted to provide medical and psychological
attention to the victims’ next of kin.97 The families, however, insist
that the government has done no more than redirect them to the
same mental health services provided through the universally ac-
cessible public health system, and that these services fall short of
the specialized and integral health services ordered by the court.98
89 Id. ¶ 215.
90 Id. ¶¶ 216–17.
91 Id. ¶ 225.
92 Gladis Torres Ruiz, Centro de Justicia para las Mujeres de Ciudad Juárez, DIARIO
ROTATIVO, Mar. 22, 2012, http://rotativo.com.mx/seguridad/repudian-nuevo-centro-
de-justicia-para-las-mujeres/87988/html/.
93 Marina Martı́nez Orpineda, Inauguran hoy Centro modelo para la mujer, EL MEXI-
CANO (Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.oem.com.mx/elmexicano/notas/n2481587.htm.
94 Ofrece CIDH apertura para avanzar en solución de casos en Chihuahua UniRadio In-
forma.com, (Mar. 22, 2012, 5:55 PM), http://uniradioinforma.com/noticias/articulo1
05995.html.
95 Torres Ruiz, supra note 92.
96 PRIMER INFORME, supra note 59, at 6.
97 Id. at 6–9.
98 Press Release, Asociación Nacional de Abogados Democráticos, et al., Incumple
Estado Mexicano Sentencia de la CoIDH (June 14, 2010). See also Gloria Leticia Dı́az,
Niega SEGOB polı́tia de elusión contra sentencias de la CoIDH, PROCESO.COM.MX, (Sept. 22,
2011), http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=282116.
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THE FUTURE OF MEXICO’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT’S REMEDIES
Felipe Zamora Castro, the interior ministry’s Deputy Secretary
of Judicial Matters and Human Rights, recently spoke at a confer-
ence titled, “Challenges and Possibilities in Complying with the
Judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Against
Mexico.”99 Claiming that the Mexican government was committed
to fulfilling its international obligations,100 he pointed to the lack
of adequate regulations to implement the court’s decisions and
called for constitutional reform.101 Even so, Zamora Castro also de-
clared that the Mexican government, confronted with economic
difficulties, “is not obligated to comply with the impossible.”102 Spe-
cifically in relation to the court’s ruling in Cotton Field, Zamora Cas-
tro indicated that the federal government assumed expenses in
paying reparations to the victims’ families, since the Chihuahua
state government was unable to fulfill its financial responsibility.103
The Mexican government has also conveyed in a report to the
CEDAW Committee that many legislative and regulatory challenges
exist to implementing the court’s ruling.104 The federal govern-
ment specifically indicates a need for better interagency coordina-
tion both horizontally (among the three federal branches:
legislative, executive, and judicial) and vertically (among the
“three orders of government”).105 Zamora Castro has publicly ac-
knowledged that a sentiment of “mutual distrust” exists between
the government and the representatives of the victims’ families.106
The families of the three named victims maintain that the
Mexican government is not fulfilling the remedies ordered by the
court.107 In a report prepared in June 2010, several representative
organizations detailed the government’s dismal level of completion
99 Gloria Leticia Dı́az, Propone Segob reforma constitucional para acatar sentencias de la
CoIDH, PROCESO.COM.MX (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=282293;
Proponen crear ley para atender compromisos internacionales de México, SDP NOTICIAS (Sept.
23, 2011) http://www.sdpnoticias.com/notas/2011/09/23/proponen-crear-ley-para-
atender-compromisos-internacionales-de-mexico.




104 CEDAW, supra note 87, ¶ 227.
105 Id. The report does not specify what is meant by “three orders of government.”
Within context, it appears to mean federal, state, and municipal governments.
106 Dı́az, supra note 98.
107 Estado pide perdón por feminicidios, supra note 73.
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of the court-ordered remedies.108
Two years ago, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (“UNHCHR”) held an expert workshop, “The Elim-
ination of all Forms of Violence Against Women—Challenges,
Good Practices, and Opportunities,” in which a panelist from Mex-
ico, Ms. Medina Rosas (lawyer and member of the civil service soci-
ety Enlace de la Red Mesa de Mujeres de Ciudad Juárez, Mexico),
noted both the contributions and shortcomings of the Cotton Field
decision, specifically with regard to implementation. The
UNHCHR report summarized Rosas’s comments:
[O]ne year after the issuing of the judgment, the Mexican State
had only published the judgment through the media and had
just recently adopted a budget line for the compensation or-
dered in the ruling. According to the panelist, the promises to
create databases, a memorial, training, protocols, counseling,
etc. had not been acted upon. She also claimed that little had
been done in terms of coordination with the various authorities
and to fight the persisting impunity. In 2010, in Ciudad Juárez
and the State of Chihuahua, no decrease in the murder rate for
women had been observed.109
Despite these immense challenges, Medina Rosas also noted good
practices stemming from the landmark decision. According to the
High Commissioner’s report, Medina Rosas noted:
[D]espite the impunity, new victims and their relatives were still
trying to obtain justice by organizing themselves and filing law-
suits, rather than trying to dispense justice themselves. She also
noted that a strong network of organizations and people existed
at local, national and international levels, providing for strong
support without which she believed the situation would have be-
come worse. Finally, she mentioned that a commission had been
set up to assess access to justice and justice administration at the
local level.110
These good practices illuminate some lessons learned from
the implementation of Cotton Field with respect to societal change.
The first good practice indicates a shift toward using the rule of law
108 Asociación Nacional De Abogados Democráticos et al., Primer Informe De Las
Vı́ctimas Sobre El Cabal Cumplimiento Del Estado Mexicano De La Sentencia Gonzá-




109 Human Rights Council, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, ¶
44, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/22 (2010).
110 Id. ¶ 45.
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(thus demonstrating respect for the rule of law), a crucial step in
an area of the world where violence can easily perpetuate flagrant
disregard for legal remedies. Furthermore, these practices high-
light many Mexicans’ desire to have access to a local support sys-
tem, including better community support and stronger
enforcement of law enforcement protocols, rather than apologies
and memorials generated at the federal level.
BEYOND IMPLEMENTATION: THE ROAD AHEAD
Mexico is far from full compliance with all components of the
court’s ruling, though it appears to have taken some steps in the
direction of a good faith effort. The State’s efforts at complying
with the court’s ruling could indicate deference to the court’s judi-
cial and enforcement authority. Even so, a larger issue looms on
the horizon. How concordant are the mandates of the court with
the wishes and needs of the broader community of victims and
their families? The absence of the named victims’ family members
at the inauguration of the monument in their honor, along with
the vocal protests of the unnamed and unrecognized victims’ fam-
ily members, revealed a dramatic chasm between the idealized
court order and the messy reality of a community struggling with
an ostensibly unstoppable succession of violent crimes against
women.
I remember sitting with Rhonda Copelon immediately after
the Inter-American Court issued its decision in the Cotton Field case.
Her joy at the court’s normative pronouncements and reparations
order was immeasurable. I think she would look at the current real-
ities of implementation of the court’s decision with a note of frus-
tration that would soon be overtaken by her forward-thinking
vision. This vision would play itself out through a series of conversa-
tions with advocates and affected individuals and through a gruel-
ing intellectual process that would ultimately result in a long-term,
strategic plan. Copelon would have no illusions of a short-term fix
to such an entrenched problem. But she would also have no com-
punction about tackling the challenges of implementation head-
on. After all, she was in the struggle for the long haul.
